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Abstract 
In a recent essay in Rethinking Marxism, as part of a special issue on the legacy of Louis Althusser’s thinking, 
Tyson E. Lewis takes up Althusser’s thinking on schooling, trade unionism, and seminars to delimit the concepts of 
interpellation, counterinterpellation, and disinterpellation respectively. While Lewis’s work is a crucial first step for 
understanding the little-known contours of Althusserian pedagogical theory, he does not elaborate key theoretical 
work done on the concept of counterinterpellation, namely that of the Marxist philosopher of language Jean-
Jacques Lercecle. Engaging with Lecercle’s work deepens Lewis’s novel argument around the newly-coined term 
disinterpellation, which he distinguishes as fundamentally educational, as opposed to interpellation and 
counterinterpellation, which he calls forms of political activism. If one considers Lecercle’s derivation of the 
concept, Lewis’s characterization of disinterpellation as educational and counterinterpellation as political activism 
changes somewhat, and broaches fundamental questions for Marxist educational theory. In this essay - which is a 
comment on Lewis’s important step towards Althusserian pedagogical theory - I will present Lecercle’s account of 
counterinterpellation, setting this concept within the larger context of Althusserian philosophy. I then respond to the 
equivalence Lewis draws between counterinterpellation and interpellation to advocate disinterpellation as a model 
for Marxist educational theory and practice, a move which poses two important questions for critical educational 
theory in the Marxist tradition: Is there a forceless force within what both Gramsci and Althusser called balance of 
forces of the political terrain, and must education be that forceless force? I show these questions and their 
implications have important theoretical consequences for Marxist educational theory and practice in general, and 
the specific theory and practice Lewis advocates. 
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Introduction 
In a fantastic essay in Rethinking Marxism, as part of a recent special issue on the legacy 
of the French communist philosopher Louis Althusser, Tyson E. Lewis (2017) takes up 
Althusser’s thinking on schooling to theorize a new concept: disinterpellation. Lewis 
distinguishes disinterpellation as fundamentally an educational concept, as opposed to 
interpellation and counterinterpellation, which he calls forms of political activism. Lewis’s work 
is an essential first step for understanding the little-known contours of Althusserian pedagogical 
theory, yet he does not engage with previous contributions to the concept of 
counterinterpellation, namely that of the Althusserian philosopher of language Jean-Jacques 
Lecercle. Engaging with Lecercle’s work deepens Lewis’s novel argument around the newly-
coined term disinterpellation. If one considers Lecercle’s derivation of the concept, Lewis’s 
characterization of disinterpellation as educational and counterinterpellation as political activism 
changes somewhat, and broaches fundamental questions about different models of critical 
educational practice.  
In this essay, I revisit the concept of interpellation, present Lecercle’s account of 
counterinterpellation, and set this concept within the larger context of Althusserian philosophy. I 
then examine Lewis’s argument for distinterpellation, responding to an equivalence he draws 
between counterinterpellation and interpellation. I critique Lewis’s formulation by posing a 
dilemma, out of which I craft a distinction between two models of critical educational practice: 
the disinterpellation model and the counterinterpellation model. The former understands critical 
education as the suspension of social forces, while the latter understands critical education as 
taking up and taking those social forces in order to shift their existing balance. 
Interpellation Revisited: The Geological Problematic 
In Althusserian philosophy, an interpellation is a concrete moment of ideological 
reproduction. When you are interpellated, you get with the program of a dominant imagined 
relation to real conditions. When you are interpellated, you become a subject of that ideology, 
recruited to the ideology, so that you “go” all by yourself and follow the ideology without any 
force compelling you. The recruitment happens immanently through some concrete practice. The 
classic case of interpellation is a police officer hailing a citizen on the street and demanding to 
see their papers. The police officer calls to the citizen, saying “hey, you there!” after which the 
citizen turns around and faces the officer, realizing (or, as Althusser writes, believing-suspecting-
knowing) that they are, in fact, the one who is being hailed. The interpellated subject believes-
suspects-knows that they are the one the officer is referring to. They are thus instructed as to how 
things are done, and they are made to get with the program: in demanding the citizen’s papers, 
the police officer compels the hailed person to verify that they are who they are according to the 
reigning imagined relations to real conditions distinguishing foreigner from citizen.  
Interpellations happen in ideological state apparatuses (ISAs), institutional spaces whose 
purpose is to make interventions on behalf of a ruling class by reproducing ruling ideologies, 
thereby achieving or maintaining their ruling status. More than just certain groups maintaining 
power over one another, these practices secure the continuity of relations of production over 
time: they hold in place a certain way of making economic life. Interpellation is therefore an 
everyday practice that exerts a reproductive force in the overall balance of social forces. The 
reproductive force exerted by an interpellative practice is distinct from the productive force that 
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modes of production exert, which is economic, and the repressive force exerted by the more or 
less unified government, courts, police, and military, which is juridical.1  
Althusser famously claimed that, with the onset of industrial capitalism, the school 
replaced the church as the most effective ideological state apparatus in the West. The family 
maintains a central place as well. Each (church, school, family) are ISAs with their own 
distinctive ways of instructing individuals to get with the program of the social formation. The 
church and the school have their own interpellations for reproducing the ideology of their 
historical moments: the church has songs and kneeling and vestments; the school its curricula, 
pedagogies, assignments, lesson plans, tests, detentions, bells, etc. Consider the following school 
interpellation from Malcolm X’s autobiography (2015). Malcolm, in remembering high school, 
recounts a moment where his history teacher Mr. Ostrowski told him to be “realistic” about his 
desire to be a lawyer and instead pursue being a busboy or carpenter, “something appropriate” 
for African American men.  
Mr. Ostrowski...leaned back in his chair and clasped his hands behind his head. 
He kind of half-smiled and said, “Malcolm, one of life's first needs is for us to be 
realistic. Don't misunderstand me, now. We all here like you, you know that. But 
you've got to be realistic about being a nigger. A lawyer, that's no realistic goal 
for a nigger. You need to think about something you can be. You're good with 
your hands, making things. Everybody admires your carpentry shop work. Why 
don't you plan on carpentry? People like you as a person, you'd get all kinds of 
work” (p.38). 
At that moment Malcolm writes that he felt shocked and recalls it as a pivotal episode in his 
development, a key experience in his socialization and politicization. Malcolm was interpellated 
during that concrete moment into what Michelle Alexander has called the racial caste system of 
the United States. Malcolm was recruited to the prevailing set of imagined relations to real 
conditions at that time, which, much like today, debased Black communities in the United States. 
In Malcolm’s case, the interpellation came from a teacher immanently reproducing ruling class 
forces in the social formation during the one-on-one conversation. His haughty mien and toxic 
use of words, combined with the intimacy of the classroom context, recruited Malcolm to the 
strict caste system in this country where people of color, specifically working class African 
American men, can only hold certain kinds of jobs. While that interpellation occurred between 
teacher and student, interpellations into racial caste can happen between students as well. W. E. 
B Du Bois (2015) opens his Souls of Black Folk with a story about himself as a young boy 
talking with a white girl on the playground at school. 
I remember well when the shadow swept across me. I was a little thing, away up 
in the hills of New England... In a wee wooden schoolhouse, something put it into 
the boys’ and girls’ heads to buy gorgeous visiting-cards––ten cents a package––
and exchange. The exchange was merry, till one girl, a tall newcomer, refused my 
                                                
1 While this is a kind of official summary of what’s widely understood to be Althusser’s theory of 
interpellation, Warren Montag (2017), one of Althusser’s most careful interpreters, reminds us that “Althusser’s 
notion of interpellation is irreducibly contradictory and complex, and its complexity is indistinguishable from the 
theoretical specificity and singularity that give it its power” (p. 1). 
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card––refused it peremptorily, with a glance. Then it dawned upon me with a 
certain suddenness that I was different from the others (p.8). 
It was the girl’s peremptory refusal of DuBois’s gift “with a glance” that DuBois had a 
realization, when it “dawned” on him “with a certain suddenness” that he “was different.” 
DuBois had the believing-suspecting-knowing moment at the little girl’s glance that he himself, 
in fact, was a certain way: marginal, less than. Just as Mr. Ostrowski interpellated Malcolm X 
into the racial caste system by telling him to be “realistic” about his job prospects, the white girl 
interpellated DuBois into otherness by refusing his card and looking at him in a particular way.  
These two examples are racial, but interpellations happen for every social category. 
Maria Dalla Costa (1971), one of the founders of the Wages for Housework campaign and of 
Marxist Feminism in Italy, writes with Selma James of the ways housewives must act with (and 
like) school teachers in providing discipline. Women, she writes, should be 
 producing docile workers and little tyrants, in the same way the teacher does at 
school. (In this the woman is joined by her husband: not by chance do parent-
teacher associations exist.) Women, responsible for the reproduction of labor 
power, on the one hand discipline the children who will be workers tomorrow and 
on the other hand discipline the husband to work today, for only his wage can pay 
for labor power to be reproduced (p. 20). 
In Malcolm’s example, a teacher interpellated a student into the racial caste system, and in 
DuBois’s, a fellow student did the interpellating. In Dalla Costa’s case, mothers and teachers are 
both interpellated and interpellate: they themselves must be disciplined to fit within patriarchal 
gender roles so they can go on to discipline children and men, reproducing labor power. In this 
case discipline is the concrete moment of interpellation. While Dalla Costa does not specify 
practices of discipline in this example, we find one in another important document in the leftist 
tradition of the United States. The Combahee River Collective’s statement remains essential for 
understanding how race, class, and gender combine. The authors include the following example 
where imagined relations to real conditions intersect and interpellate the subjectivity of Black 
working class women:  
As children we realized that we were different from boys and that we were treated 
differently. For example, we were told in the same breath to be quiet both for the 
sake of being "ladylike" and to make us less objectionable in the eyes of white 
people (Taylor 2017, p. 17). 
Children are told be to be quiet all the time, particularly in schools, and this common practice has 
ideological significance depending on the social formation in which it occurs. For the Combahee 
River Collective, as Black socialist feminists, black working class girls getting told to be quiet 
has two ideological meanings, or is said with two “breaths.” The first breath is an interpellation 
into patriarchy: to be quiet and be “ladylike.” The second breath is an interpellation into racial 
caste: to be quiet and be “less objectionable in the eyes of white people.” The interpellation of 
being told to be quiet, as black working class girls, therefore has at least two reproductive layers: 
the reproduction of patriarchy and the reproduction of racial caste. When told to be quiet, these 
activists recall how they believed-suspected-knew that they were being imbricated into the raced 
and gendered relations of production in their capitalist social formation. This example of 
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educational practice shows that, inevitably, interpellations reproduce intersectional imagined 
relations to real conditions. Each of the previous examples could be given such an intersectional 
analysis: Malcolm’s conversation with Mr. Ostrowski had a gendered and classed aspect, as well 
as Du Bois’s. Dalla Costa’s claim about women reproducing labor power stands at the 
intersection of gender and class. In each case, concrete practices interpellate subjectivity with 
intersecting social categories like race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, religion, and nationality. 
Interpellations are therefore small moments with big meanings: they are the concrete 
practical moments whereby social context weaves through consciousness, connecting with and 
composing individual subjectivity. Schools seethe with such practices, whether it be teachers 
meeting with students, students playing with one another on the playground, or adults telling 
children to be quiet. In a sense, any school event could potentially have some interpellative 
significance. Thinking about school practices as interpellative is one way of thinking critically 
about school in general.  
There is a long tradition of critical educational research accounting for such 
interpellations at school. One could read much of Marxist sociology of education inspired by 
Bowles and Gintis (2011) as measuring school interpellations both quantitatively and 
qualitatively. In Apple and King’s (1979) ethnography of a kindergarten classroom in a working 
class school, the authors focus on how the teacher interpellates the imagined relation of private 
property to real conditions, as well as the distinction between work and play. One anecdote 
shows the teacher asking her students to find their cubbies without having their names labeled on 
them. When asked why the students could not label their own cubbies, the teacher responded: 
“[s]tudents must learn their assigned cubby holes” without labels because “that is their job” (p. 
50). Students, from a very young age, must learn that they have a space that is their own in 
within larger spaces: that this cubby is their cubby. Further, students must learn that doing this is 
is “their job,” that the classroom is a work space and not a play space.  
In Anyon’s (1981) research pointing to the ways school knowledge is classed, she looked 
at schools serving students in five different class categories, and how practices at these schools 
interpellated students to their respective class position. For example, a teacher in the working 
class school admonished one of her students when they asked for an explanation of a math 
problem’s solution. The teacher said there was no need for them to understand and told her to 
“[j]ust do what I’m doing” (p. 11). Rather than explain and ensure students learn the concepts 
behind what they were doing, the working class students were interpellated to follow the 
authority without that deeper understanding. In contrast, at the school serving students from 
affluent-professional families, a teacher told students “you decide!” when they asked for 
guidance on how to complete an assignment. These affluent-professional students were 
interpellated into their class position by being pushed to improve their own individual decision-
making skills when completing their school work.  
Carnoy and Levin’s (1985) empirical work measures four dimensions of class 
correspondences, comparing and contrasting practices observed in a low-income high school and 
a high-income high school. They completed ethnographic research in the two schools and 
counted, for example, the number of teacher behaviors that encouraged students to have an 
external locus of control (where authority comes from someone else) or an internal locus of 
control (where authority comes from one’s self). They found that, in the working class school, 
83% of messages from teachers taught students to respect an external locus of control. One 
paradigm case of an interpellation for external control was a teacher saying repeatedly “I want 
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that done now” in the context of classroom assignments (p. 115). The locus for control in this 
interpellation is obviously the teacher: students should do the assignment because the teacher 
wants it done, not because students have decided for themselves that it is a good thing to do. In 
contrast, teachers at the upper middle class school gave students messages communicating an 
internal locus of control by a clear majority: 67% of messages teachers sent were for an internal 
locus of control. An example of one such message came from a teacher speaking with a student 
who had been distracted during one lesson. The teacher asked the student, “why do you do this to 
yourself?” (p. 120). The question is structured to communicate that the student has an internal 
locus of control, yet their behavior violates that locus. The teacher interpellates this internal locus 
of control by appealing to it in their disciplinary speech. 
In each of these cases, research points to how schools interpellate for the dominant forces 
in society: recruiting subjects from individual students by propagating debasing and constraining 
ideologies immanently in school practices. But there have been important critiques of this 
Althusserian framework for understanding school practices. Althusser’s philosophy fell out of 
fashion in the 1980s and 1990s for a variety of reasons, one of the most oft-repeated being that 
the philosophy (and social reproduction theory in general) does not leave room for human 
agency. In each formulation above, it can appear as though the social formation is determining 
an individual’s subjectivity, as though the individual is a robot being programmed by a force 
greater than their self. This critique was most passionately made by Edward P. Thompson (1978) 
in The Poverty of Theory, was emphatically applied to education by Paul Willis (1981) and then 
repeated by Henry Giroux (1983). While there is not sufficient space in this essay to fully 
represent and respond to Thompson’s and Willis’s critiques, it is important to note key 
developments in Althusser’s philosophy which make matters more complicated. 
Interpellations do not successfully reproduce ideology just by virtue of occurring. An 
interpellation is not a done deal. As Stuart Hall (1973/2001) famously argues in 
“Encoding/Decoding,” subjects do not always decode encoded messages properly. There is a gap 
between the encoded message, the interpellation, and the individual who decodes that message. 
Ideology, Hall writes elsewhere (1986), is without guarantees. There are no guarantees that an 
intervention made in an ideological state apparatus will succeed: interpellations misfire, get lost 
in the mix, or get taken up in unintended ways (see Martel, 2017 for a well-developed theory of 
misinterpellation). An interpellation is not the final shot in the battle to maintain hegemony, but 
rather an opening salvo that ruling classes launch to maintain that control in the specific balance 
of forces under consideration.  
School is no exception. As Willis (1977) carefully described in Learning to Labour: How 
Working Class Kids Get Working Class Jobs, interpellations that teachers and other school 
officials attempt can be blocked, minced, or rerouted by individual students. The interpellations 
do not mechanically land and automatically make individuals subject to ideology. Willis was a 
student and colleague of Stuart Hall’s, and his original ethnographic work recognized what Hall 
explores in his own development of Althusser’s thinking: the contingency of social structure. A 
balance of forces could always be other than it is. The fact that dominant forces in that balance 
attempt to recruit for their ideology, but not always successfully, is an important point to note in 
understanding interpellation, particularly how it was taken up (or not) by future generations of 
educational researchers.  
Althusserian philosophy, specifically Althusser’s concept of social structure, is an 
extension and development of the notion that society is a formation, a contingent balance of 
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forces. This notion that a society is a social formation was one of Marx’s contributions to social 
thinking in general when he noted that capitalist economies entail a struggle between classes. 
There is an inherent struggle for power in such economies, a class struggle, within which each 
group continually vies for superior position. Vladimir Lenin developed this thinking further by 
posing the idea of hegemony, or class control, which Antonio Gramsci then reconceptualized, 
drawing from Niccolo Machiavelli, into the idea of a political terrain or landscape composed of 
social forces, or the myriad complex ways social forces array and direct themselves. Althusser 
added to this tradition by pointing out that this balance of forces has a structure. But that 
structure, he adamantly maintained with his forebears from Marx to Gramsci, is fundamentally 
contingent: no matter how much control one class has over another, no matter how subordinated 
one group is to another, that balance can always change. Althusser’s concept of social structure 
is that society is a balance of forces structured in dominance: that arrays of social forces have 
orderings of superior and subordinate classes, but that ordering could be always otherwise, 
depending on how successfully subordinate classes engage in the class struggle. Interpellations, 
we must remember, happen within that contingently structured balance of forces.  
Despite what Willis (1981) and Giroux (1983) claim, social structure in Althusserian 
philosophy is not some transcendent machine determining the course of individual lives, leaving 
no room for freedom or agency. His philosophy is neither mechanistic nor functionalist, though 
he does sometimes write those words. Rather Althusser’s philosophy, following the most 
important contributions to Marxist thinking throughout the twentieth century, is premised on the 
freedom inherent in class struggle. Even in his (in)famous essay “Ideology and the Ideological 
State Apparatuses: Notes Towards an Investigation,” Althusser (1970) included a section on 
resistance that is not often cited:  
The Ideological State Apparatuses may be not only the stake, but also the site of 
class struggle, and often of bitter forms of class struggle. The class (or class 
alliance) in power cannot lay down the law in the ISAs as easily as it can in the 
(repressive) State apparatus, not only because the former ruling classes are able to 
retain strong positions there for a long time, but also because the resistance of the 
exploited classes is able to find means and occasions to express itself there, either 
by the utilization of their contradictions, or by conquering combat positions in 
them in struggle...The class struggle is thus expressed and exercised in ideological 
forms, thus also in the ideological forms of the ISAs. But the class struggle 
extends far beyond these forms, and it is because it extends beyond them that the 
struggle of the exploited classes may also be exercised in the forms of the ISAs, 
and thus turn the weapon of ideology against the classes in power. (p. 147) 
Althusser’s philosophy was always a philosophy of struggle, a development of the geological 
problematic that understands society as a formation, a balance of forces where each force 
engages in contestation. Rather than a finely-tuned mechanism or series of functions yielding a 
social equilibrium, the geological problematic casts society as a teetering arrangement of 
elements (groups, individuals) arranged in variations (political positions and practices) which, 
over time, layer into regions (the largest features of the social formation) which are relatively 
autonomous from one another. Groups fight in various ways to keep or win or block hegemony. 
Such struggles happen at weak sites in the social formation where, inevitably, ruling classes 
cannot control the formation fully. These sites are sometimes called contradictions in the Marxist 
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tradition, the full set of which Gramsci calls the conjuncture. Althusser contributed to this 
tradition of the geological problematic by distinguishing the ISAs from the repressive state 
apparatus and describing how they work. As Pêcheux (2015) would write later, “class struggle 
traverses the mode of production in its entirety and that, in the sphere of ideology, class struggle 
occurs through the ISAs” (p. 3). Victories by subordinated groups at the conjuncture force 
concessions, and sometimes lead to significant changes in the formation. The activists cited at 
the beginning of this essay are paradigm cases: while they were interpellated into their respective 
social formations, they successfully struggled in and through those social formations to 
transform them.  
Their activism is not somehow alien to Althusser’s philosophy, but rather robust 
examples to look at with this philosophy. Society is not a machine in the geological problematic, 
nor is it a set of functions, but rather a terrain, and Althusser was one of the most important 
theorists to expand on the philosophical implications of this geological problematic. 
Interpellation was a flagship contribution in this regard, providing a way of naming how fine-
grained, everyday practices have great significance within the social formation. Althusser did 
this philosophical work explicitly against the mechanistic problematic espoused by leaders in 
some communist parties in the twentieth century. Althusser’s theories of structural causality, 
relative autonomy, and overdetermination paved the way for ground-breaking arguments in 
cultural studies, such as those of Stuart Hall mentioned earlier. Thus much of the writing about 
Althusser in educational theory that we inherit today has misunderstood Althusserian philosophy, 
and therefore misunderstood its potency for pedagogy.  
This is the intellectual scene in which Lewis (2017) makes his own fascinating 
intervention, opening up Althusserian pedagogical theory in a novel way. He recognizes that 
Althusser was in fact improving an already antimechanistic philosophy, writing that 
interpellation “is never complete, always missing its mark” (p. 306) and opens by giving a short 
presentation of the Althusserian linguist Michel Pêcheux’s concept of counterinvestment. Lewis 
thereby introduces the terms counterinterpellation and disinterpellation: 
My use of the terms interpellation, counterinterpellation, and disinterpellation are 
inspired by Michel Pêcheux’s analysis of identification. For Pêcheux (2015), 
identification indicates a coincidence of subject and Subject (or individual and 
state). Counteridentification, on the other hand, suggests a breakdown of this 
coincidence in the form of refusals and revolts. No longer is the empirically given 
identical to the dominant ideology. This breakdown results in an inverse form of 
interpellation-identification-subjection through which bourgeois ideology is 
appropriated and used against itself (p. 304). 
This inversion of the interpellation, resulting from a breakdown in the coincidence between 
subject and Subject, taking the form of refusals and revolts, is precisely the geological 
problematic at work. Lewis’s focus, as is evident here, is not necessarily on counterinterpellation 
but rather his new notion of disinterpellation, a “suspension of the trajectory” of both 
interpellations and counterinterpellations. Disinterpellation, he claims, does not get caught up in 
the problems of counterinterpellation, which represent the potential reassertion of bourgeois 
ideologies from the inside.  
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What follows is an analysis of Lewis’s worthy arguments, though my analysis amounts to 
a critique that his interpretation of counterinterpellation may be too quick. Considering the work 
of the Althusserian philosopher of language Jean-Jacques Lecercle, who built on Pêcheux’s 
linguistics and coined the term, a couterinterpellation takes up and takes on interpellations so as 
to alter the balance of forces from which it issues. Counterinterpellation, for Lecercle, is an insult 
to the insult of ideological reproduction by ruling classes. As I hope to show, deeper engagement 
with Lecercle’s work shows that Lewis’s essay, while integral to any examination of Altusserian 
pedagogy, conceals larger theoretical and political questions about critical educational practice. 
Counterinterpellation: Insulting the Insult 
There was never a linguistic turn in Marxism. There have been significant studies of language 
and discourse in leftist thinking on politics, economy, and society, and it is obvious in these 
studies that language is an integral part of social life. But there was never an analogous 
movement in Marxism comparable to the one made by early analytic philosophers to prioritize 
the function of language above all other philosophical concerns. Jean-Jacques Lecercle (2006) 
begins from this premise in his A Marxist Philosophy of Language, published in French in 1991 
and translated to English in 2006. Lecercle compiles a canon of historical-materialist texts and 
perspectives on meaning, utterance, and truth; articulates central premises of the Marxist 
philosophy of language; then contrasts this philosophy with others, such as Noam Chomsky’s 
methodological individualism and Habermasian communicative action. Lecercle proposes the 
term counterinterpellation in this context. Althusser’s allegorical interpellation “hey, you there!” 
obviously relies on a speech act to subject the individual to the dominant ideology, and Lecercle 
writes that such speech imposes a set of ideological constraints on listeners. In Lecercle’s theory, 
linguistic meaning is composed of such sedimented ideological constraints, established over time 
in the balance of forces via layers of interpellations occurring throughout multiple apparatuses. 
Speaking, in this theory, is a perpetual fixing of subject positions.  
Yet the ideological constraints which compose linguistic meaning, and thus the constant 
flow of interpellations, are always “subject to creative exploitation” (p.208). The fixed subject 
position can be unfixed; in fact, it is always in a constant state of struggle over its composition in 
the balance of forces. Lecercle’s argument for why the fixed subject position is always subject to 
unfixing comes from an insight about idiosyncratic speech. We must learn to speak a language 
which pre-exists us and within which we must form our sense of self, but we also speak the 
language in undeniably unique ways. Poetry, innuendo, paradox, neologism, philosophy, and 
puns all happen within and against the prefabricated linguistic structures speakers must speak. 
Lecercle’s extends this insight about language to ideology and generates the notion of 
counterinterpellation. 
As I speak, I counterinterpellate the language that interpellates me to my place as 
a speaker, which makes me what I am. I exploit the potentialities of meaning that 
it provides me with, I play tricks with and on it, I accept or reject the names with 
which it assigns me a place in the community of speakers or excludes me from 
it…the speaker acts on and in language by using it (p. 208).  
What “makes me what I am” is not the one-way interpellation of the subject by state power, but 
rather the two-way negotiation between the interpellation and the interpellateds’ tricks, 
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rejections, and exploitations of that interpellation. Working in that same geological problematic 
inaugurated by Gramsci and built upon by Althusser, Lecercle claims that by speaking, the 
subject can “act on and in” the ideological constraints imposed by the interpellation. This action 
“has the form of a counterinterpellation” (p. 208). He writes: “the insult that wounds me and 
seeks to fix me in an interlocutory, subjective position which I do not want to occupy can not 
only be returned, but taken up, taken on, and revalued” (p. 115). 
Counterinterpellation is therefore an insult to the insult of interpellation, a linguistic-
ideological negation of the negation by negotiation. This negotiation happens in speech acts, the 
things we say to one another every day, but has ideological and political ramifications. Rather 
than large-scale dialectical movements these are minute dialect moments: the conversations, 
chats, and back-and-forths of everyday life which can constitute, deconstitute, and reconstitute 
our relations of production. These interactions can fix individuals in subjective positions through 
successful insults, insofar as the interpellation reproduces, through the speech act, an 
exploitative, debasing, marginalizing, alienating relation of production. A successful 
interpellation requires the message be encoded by the apparatuses of ruling classes properly and 
decoded properly by subject. But the background of struggle within which that interpellation has 
fixed the subject, the social formation and its balance of forces, implies the equal and opposite 
possibility for that subject’s unfixing. The interpellation can be “returned, taken up, taken on, 
and revalued” through “creative exploitation.” 
This fixing-unfixing view of language is non-fetishistic, letting language and thus 
ideology itself “change, develop, and vary through [speakers’] linguistic practice” (p. 145). After 
the interpellation has occurred there are myriad and obvious opportunities to accept or reject the 
ideological constraints imposed by the moment of interpellation (p.145). Counterinterpellation 
thus admits that there is a set of constraints external to and prior to social existence which fix the 
individual speaker into a subject position. Yet by virtue of its very existence as a moment of 
fixation in the balance of forces, this subject position is subject to negotiation, open to shifting 
and reappropriation by a newly fixed subject.  
The speaker is therefore interpellated to her place by language, but, in so far as 
she makes the language her language, she counterinterpellates it: she plays with it, 
pushes it to its limits, accepts its constraints in order to subvert them...Hence the 
interpellated one counter-interpellates the ideology that interpellates her (p. 164). 
Thus there is a kind of free and creative expression possible within the play, push, and 
subversion of interpellations. This free creativity is sponsored by the conditions of the 
interpellation itself. Lecercele’s argument accords with the geological problematic laid out 
earlier: there could be no interpellation unless there was an arena of struggle and negotiation in 
which the interpellation took place. Interpellations only make sense in the context of struggle. 
The terrain of struggle does not disappear after the interpellation hits its mark. Rather, society 
itself is a social formation where forces constantly struggle. Thinking about language as part of 
the terrain, the balance of forces, is what makes Lecercle’s Marxist philosophy of language 
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unique among philosophies of language, contributing to Althusser’s immanent structuralist 
paradigm.2  
For Lecercle, speakers are interpellated by the ideological constraints composing 
language, yet the speaker can simultaneously counterinterpellate by speaking that language 
creatively. The constraints which enable the speaker to speak against the dominant ideology are 
set by the same conditions in which an ideological state apparatus attempts to interpellate them: 
struggle. The counterinterpellation where speakers speak in their own right is part of struggle, an 
answer to the interpellations issued by ruling classes. The counterinterpellation is a taking up and 
taking on those interpellations to shift the balance of forces away from the ruling class’s control. 
Counterinterpellations are therefore not what Walker (1985), commenting on Willis (1977), calls 
recuscance, or the mere refusal of interpellation. The counterinterpellation must answer the 
interpellation, not just resist it, distinguishing Lecercle’s theory from Willis’s and Giroux’s 
concept of resistance wherein human agency appears ex nihilo, without a structural 
understanding of struggle. Rather it is more in accordance with Althusser’s concept of resistance 
laid out earlier: the ways working classes wage successful battles in the ISAs, using ideology as 
a weapon against the ruling classes. Not just any refusal, rejection, or reaction would count as a 
counterinterpellation. Only those responses and speech acts which take on, take up, and return 
the interpellation: that is the counterinterpellation.  
Lecercle unfortunately does not offer detailed examples of counterinterpellation. 
Arguably, the life and work of the activists cited at the beginning of this essay are rich with 
counterinterpellations. Look at Malcolm X’s speeches and organizing activity; W.E.B Du Bois’s 
writings throughout his career; Mariarosa Dalla Costa’s work with the Wages for Housework 
campaign; as well as the Combahee River Collective’s activism. The histories of these important 
activists are treasure troves of counterinterpellations. More examples from classrooms follow at 
the end of this essay, but Lecercle does mention two of note. The first comes from the queer 
community. In a brief remark, he writes that by using the term queer that community was able to 
creatively reappropriate derogatory terms, the very language used to enact their marginalization 
(p. 218). He also mentions telemarketing as another example, specifically when a receiver of a 
telemarketing call talks back to the telemarketer:  
the telephone operator who replies to a demand for information cannot allow 
herself to devote more than a certain number of seconds to each conversation, if 
she is to meet the objectives that have been set for her, which obey profit 
constraints. Far from being the site of freedom of expression and ethical 
responsibility, such conversations obey a fixed standard schema, whose ideal is a 
completely automated exchange (an artificial, but nevertheless cheerful voice 
encourages me, if I want to check my accounts, to press the star button). Even 
when the operator is still a human subject, her language is strictly controlled: tone 
of voice, formulae for addressing the customer and ending the conversation, 
vocabulary and levels of language, no expressive or stylistic choice, no 
personalisation of the utterance permitted. Pretend customers and real inspectors, 
or recording machines, will take care of verifying that instructions are properly 
                                                
2 Althusser’s is a rejection of transcendent structure in favor of immanent structure, a distinction which, 
along with Willis and Giroux’s misreading, deserves more attention as part of a larger project (see Backer, 
unpublished). 
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applied, with ‘evaluation’ interviews on offer. Here, the practice of 
communication is the exact opposite of the ideology of communication: it aims to 
prohibit (in the case of the employee) and limit to the maximum (in the case of the 
customer) freedom of expression, the ethical responsibility of speech, and the 
irenic co-operation of dialogue as sharing and consensual search for agreement. In 
these conditions of rigid interpellation, the only possible counterinterpellation is 
the raising of the voice by the furious customer who insults an operator whom she 
knows is not responsible and the collective struggle of operators to improve their 
working conditions. For this communication, like any other, is the site of power 
relations. (p. 218) 
By raising their voice against the telemarketer, the person on the other end of the line taps into a 
balance of forces set by the ideological constraints demanded by an exploitative mode of 
production. When the customer raises their voice at the telemarketer, it is one of only a few 
options to take up and take on these constraints from within and alter the balance. Lecercle 
mentions at the end of this example that the “collective struggle of operators to improve their 
working conditions” is a possible counterinterpellation as well. Union organizing is a good 
example and fits exactly with Althusser’s example of the trade union as a school for working 
against interpellations, which Lewis (2017) cites as counterinterpellative because it is 
counterideological to capitalist relations of production (p. 310).3  
Lewis’s Disinterpellation 
By way of contrast, Lewis argues that counterinterpellation is not disinterpellation. A 
disinterpellation is neither a reproduction of existing relations of production nor a creative 
expropriation of that interpellation. Rather, recalling terms from Althusser’s later work on 
aleatory materialism, disinterpellation is the productive non-production of a nonstate. 
Disinterpellative study, for Lewis, preserves the weak power of impotentiality by suspending the 
interpellation or counterinterpellation of anything. Interpellation is an insult. 
Counterinterpellation insults the insult. Disinterpellation is neither an insult nor an insult to the 
insult, but rather the suspension of any insult. But Lewis, on the way to his fascinating argument 
for disinterpellation, draws an equivalence between interpellation and counterinterpellation. For 
his central thesis, he reads Pêcheux as saying that a counteridentification is an inversion of 
identification, leading to the same result as an identification: 
For Pêcheux, the problem with a political strategy predicated solely on 
counteridentification is that inversion merely reasserts bourgeois ideology in a 
new form thus insuring its dominance over the workers’ movement from the 
inside. Disidentification then is the moment of ideological rupture, which is an 
attack on the trajectory of interpellation and counterinterpellation. Because it 
holds open a possibility to move beyond this cycle, disidentification offers a 
fundamental move...I will follow a similar line of analysis but with a focus on 
educational problematics. My goal is to offer a new, Marxist notion of education 
that does not get caught up in the problems of counteridentification, as theorized 
                                                
3 Though of course unions themselves are not always such schools of struggle. Most unions in the United 
States, McAlevey (2016) points out, rarely think about their work as having anything to do with class struggle. 
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by Pêcheux, and instead offers the possibility of a suspension of the trajectory that 
leads from interpellation to counterinterpellation and back again. (p. 304) 
While Lewis opens with this reading of Pêcheux, thereby establishing an equivalence between 
interpellation and counterinterpellation, he moves on to educational examples without lingering 
on this important premise in his argument. Pêcheux’s analysis of identification, counter-
identification, and dis-identification deserves more attention than I can give it here. We should 
note however that Pêcheux claims a counter-identification is superficial and too credulous when 
it comes to ideology, “taking [dominant ideology] at its word and reversing it” (p. 11). 
Counterinterpellation, in Lecercle’s conception, is not “taking ideology at its word” to merely 
reverse it superficially. Rather, counterinterpellation takes up and takes on ideology to shift 
forces in the conjuncture. At least in terms of the philosophical arguments, Lecercle’s 
counterinterpellation may be more like Pêcheux’s dis-identification. 
Lewis continues with the equivalence, however. To demonstrate this equivalence using 
educational examples, Lewis first characterizes unions as an ideological revolutionary apparatus, 
or IRA, which involve their own kind of subjectivation. An IRA, like an ISA, hails subjects and 
recruits them. Thus he writes that “hailing, whether interpellative or counterinterpellative, is 
about giving the subject an orientation according to a predefined set of ideological themes” (p. 
311). Lewis then argues that counterinterpellation is not educational:  
what I want to suggest is that…[in] a counterinterpellation through which subjects 
come to recognize themselves as revolutionary, there is something educationally 
missing here. Indeed, it would appear that...there is a total collapse of education 
into political activism. As such, education evaporates as a theoretical problem 
needing philosophical development (p. 311). 
Lewis goes on to identify disinterpellation as educational, properly speaking. The 
disinterpellation clears a space “outside any ideologically bound territories” in an encounter 
between “nameless atoms, [in] a field of force relations rather than knowing relations” (p. 313). 
It is this force emerging from the encounter that provides the educational experience, since it is 
not a “subjective disposition or even a desire but rather a force that emerges from a clash and 
pileup of atoms” (p. 315). The subject dissolves in this clash-force, an “unpredictable eruption 
wherein...no one controls it, no one has particular rights over interpreting it, and no one can 
predict its outcomes” (p. 314). The subjectless moment of force in this clash is therefore “an 
education through desubjectification” and “is part of a larger Marxist agenda because it is only in 
the abrupt collapse of the...subject that one can touch a communist horizon” (p. 315).  
The conclusion here is a significant one, as it yields a model for critical educational 
practice:  “Marxist education is a practice in which...the product is a subject without a subject (a 
subject estranged from itself, a desubjectivized subject)” (p. 314).4 Disinterpellation is the 
definition of Marxist education because it “destabilizes and suspends any and every interpellative 
process in order to open the subject to that which is beyond subjectivity” (p. 316). The seminar, 
for Lewis, is a pedagogy for disinterpellation since 
                                                
4 Note that Pêcheux (2015) explicitly says dis-identification is not “a question of an impossible 
desubjectification of the subject” (p.12). It is therefore not clear that Lewis’s disinterpellation correlates to 
Pecheux’s dis-identification in the way Lewis implies. 
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 students, materials… and the teacher enter into a constellation of forces that 
destabilize and thus open up a space and a time wherein a new kind of educational 
life beyond the subject temporarily forms...that does not have a proper name or 
destination (p. 316).  
During seminars “the very conditions for a different world open up” and thereby set the 
“preconditions for a different kind of world” (p. 316).   
In Lewis’ account, a counterinterpellation is included in the concept “any and every 
interpellation” because a counterinterpellation sets a counter-constraint. This counter-constraint 
recruits individuals to positions in the balance of forces. Education, for Lewis, hangs in the 
balance: since a counterideology is still an ideology, and a counterinterpellation still fixes a 
subject position, neither can be properly educational. Rather, they are political activism. Only the 
disinterpellation, which is neither interpellation nor counterinterpellation, can be called 
educational. Yet I would contend, drawing from Lecercle’s account of counterinterpellation as an 
insult to the insult of ideological reproduction, that this conclusion simplifies a much more 
complex theoretical picture. A counterinterpellation, according to Lecercle, must take up and 
take on the insult of an interpellation, creatively exploiting the ideological constraints set within 
the existing balance of forces, potentially altering that balance. To take an interpellation up and 
take it on in the balance of forces is to exert a force in that balance, not merely turning the 
interpellation around but rather engaging in effective struggle. A counterinterpellation is not just 
a reversed interpellation, just as a counterideology is not just a reversed ideology. I draw two 
main conclusions from this insight, from which I then extract two models of critical educational 
practice: the disinterpellation model and the counterinterpellation model.  
Distinterpellation or Counterinterpellation?  
Consider first that counterinterpellation must be educational. To take up and take on 
dominant ideologies and potentially alter the balance of forces of a social formation, speakers 
must study, learn, and teach in robust ways. It would require a non-negligible educational 
experience to successfully counterinterpellate. A person fixed in a position by the dominant 
forces of the social formation must learn what the contours of that balance of forces are, 
experiment with interventions, and decide to creatively exploit them in such a way as to 
potentially shift the balance. This taking up and taking on would require knowing the balance of 
forces as they are, conceiving of the weaknesses or tensions within that balance, and then 
successfully formulating a proposition or action which would push on that weakness such that it 
has a meaningful consequence. This process is entirely educational. 
Take, for example, the case of Joe Szwaja and his students in Celia Oyler’s (2012) 
Actions Speak Louder than Words: Community Activism as Curriculum. In 1996, at the protests 
against the World Trade Organization in Seattle, Mr. Szwaja incorporated the protests into his 
social studies class focusing on globalization. Oyler reports that  
they planned a street theater piece with large Bread and Puppet style 
puppets...According to a student named Amber, they had about 500 people 
watching the street theater at one point in time. Then, after the protests were over, 
the class created a quiz for the media to take related to facts about globalization 
because they were dismayed that the coverage was about the small incidents of 
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violence [at the protests] rather than about the major issues. They sent out the quiz 
as a press release and invited journalists to come to their class (p. 26). 
 Planning for this project and executing it were clearly educational, but also 
counterinterpellative. Students quizzing the news media is a particularly creative exploitation of 
the balance of forces at that moment: students are typically the ones who are quizzed about their 
knowledge of history and social studies, but in this case the students decided to quiz society 
about its knowledge of free trade. They even invited the media to their class to learn something 
about globalization. To complete this project, Szwaja assigned essays on the history of the WTO, 
as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Act (GATT). In addition, “students wrote 
a play about sweatshop labor around the world, including alternatives to such practices” (p. 21). 
Amber, the student mentioned above, reported that “[w]e made huge puppets. We used 
cardboard and newspaper and rags. We made masks too” (p. 31). Further, students being present 
at the protests had first-hand experiential knowledge of social studies and history in action. Oyler 
reflects that Szwaja “gave his students the opportunity to engage in a curriculum of public 
protest” (38). 
According to Lewis’s argument, Oyler’s notion of a “curriculum of public protest” would 
not make sense, as public protest could not furnish an educational curriculum. Yet I think it 
limiting to deny the educational complexity of this process, the inquiry (or we might even say 
study) it requires. Reducing this process of engaging with the balance of forces to political 
activism is to deny its educativity. Of course, such a curriculum is also activism. But political 
activism can be an educational process, just as educational processes can be outright or incipient 
forms of political activism.  
This point about the relationship between political activism and education gestures 
towards a fundamental question in Marxist educational theory. Again, a key concept that forms 
the political-ontological background of Althusser’s philosophy is the Gramscian notion of 
political terrain, or balance of forces. The terrain created by the balance of forces is what makes 
the geological problematic so novel and important in the history of social theory. If society, 
according to this problematic, is always a social formation of forces; and if classes, groups, 
factions, and fractions exert these forces; and these forces are always in a balance with one 
another, then it is not only an equivalence but a false equivalence to say, as Lewis does, that 
subordinate forces in that balance are meaingfully similar to the dominant forces because they 
are forces. In terms of the geological problematic, Lewis presumes that because a force counters 
another force, each are meaningfully similar by virtue of their being forces. At this point in the 
argumentation, a dilemma emerges. 
Lewis claims that there is a concrete educational practice called disinterpellation that 
erupts in a moment where force relations come into being without knowledge relations, 
dissolving subjectivity to create the preconditions for a different world. No one controls this 
moment, no one determines the outcomes. The moment is beyond ideology. This 
disinterpellation suspends subjectivation, rendering recruitment inoperative. Going back to the 
geological problematic, and taking this insight with us, we would have to assume Lewis is 
arguing that there is a kind of force, an educational force, that is forceless. To be more precise, 
this educative position in the balance of forces exerts a force, but because no one controls it and 
there is no ideology, this force does not recruit for any imagined relation to real conditions. 
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Lewis interprets Althusser’s notion of the encounter, at least within education, as a moment 
where imagined relations to real conditions are suspended.  
This forceless force itself is a matter for further thinking, as it is not clear how a Marxist 
theory of the political terrain, following the geological problematic, would permit there to be 
such a force. Questions abound. First, is there a place beyond ideology? Lewis claims that a 
disinterpellation suspends any imagined relation to real conditions in a nameless place of the 
balance of forces that no one controls. Is there such a thing? Wouldn’t a social force qua social 
force exert pressure on behalf of some imagined relation to real conditions, even if that imagined 
relation to real conditions stipulates that, according to it, it does not stipulate any imagined 
relation to real conditions? In Althusser’s ideology theory, such a position would still be an 
imagined relation to real conditions. And, if this is true, does this supposed imagined relation to 
real conditions that imagines it is not an imagined relation to real conditions end up in a kind of 
neutrality, or a place outside of politics?  
Lewis has a robust response to this set of questions. He claims that the disinterpellation 
opens up the possibility of a communal being, and that, in a capitalist social formation, this 
desubjectivized moment of forcelessness is a kind of communist horizon (p. 316). He cites Derek 
R. Ford (2016) and Curry Malott with Derek Ford (2015) here, whose books take up these 
questions. Yet such a communal imagined relation to real conditions is not a suspension of all 
ideology, but rather an ideology with certain features, namely that of a communist horizon. 
While claiming that the suspension of imagined relations to real conditions in a capitalist social 
formation leads to an imagined relation of communist horizon to real conditions is a fascinating 
move to make, it leads to an educational dilemma in the geological problematic.  
An example from critical educational practice would be helpful to illustrate the dilemma. Lewis 
uses the seminar as his example of educational practice, and I presume that discussion (speaking 
and listening about a question held in common) would be a central feature of such seminars. I 
have argued elsewhere (Backer & Lewis 2016, Backer 2017b) that classroom discussion, if 
facilitated such that different participants address one another in an equal and various sequence 
of turn-taking, can lead to the suspension of active prohibitions in the psyche, or what Jacques 
Lacan calls dehiscence. To mix Lewis’s language with this claim about discussion, when there 
are a mix of moves in classroom discussion, and no one follows up one another more than 
anyone else, there is a disinterpellation. Such a discussion, according to the disinterpellation 
model, is an eruption in the balance of forces, taking participants beyond ideological territory to 
desubjectify the discussion participants. In a capitalist social formation, capitalist social forces 
may suspend, but what occurs in that suspended moment need not be a communist horizon. In 
principle, it should not be any horizon. But if it is a communist horizon, then the seminar was a 
counterinterpellation, according to Lecercle’s account of the idea, since the discussion took up 
the constraints of a capitalist formation and took them on to shift the balance of forces enough to 
render a communist horizon there in the classroom.  
The result is a dilemma: either the disinterpellation recruits for no ideology whatsoever, 
or, if it recruits for a communist ideology in a capitalist social formation, then it is a 
counterinterpellation. In this case, I would argue that the discussion in the seminar was a 
counterinterpellation and not a distinterpellation. The discussion is not a forceless force, but 
rather a practice taking place in a balance of forces where all forces have impact in some 
direction, whether that direction be with the seam of dominant forces, with some alternative 
subordinate seam, or, inevitably, an uneven mixture thereof. The seminar has to have some 
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impact in the balance of forces, or otherwise be an impactless impactor, which may be possible, 
as mentioned before, but would be difficult to theorize in the geological problematic. 
The dilemma implied by this forceless force has further implications. That the seminar 
discussion would have some impact in the balance of forces is a first point. A second point is 
implied: just as the seminar impacts the social forces within which it takes place, this seminar 
and its participants would be impacted by other social forces relatively independently of the 
social force they exert. Even if subjectivating forces are rendered inoperative by the discussion, 
there would still be forces emanating from the modes of production, repressive apparatus, and 
other reproductive apparatuses. What if a student looks at their cellphone during the seminar, for 
example? The media state apparatus makes an intervention as the disinterpellation takes hold. 
Does the disinterpellation suspend that social force too? To what extent? Other productive and 
repressive forces could be exerted on the classroom, even while the classroom exerts a school-
based reproductive force that suspends certain forces.  
Consider student debt as an example. If a professor enters a university classroom where 
students are indebting themselves by taking the course, then does the disinterpellation occurring 
in this professor’s seminar suspend the social force of the debt students accrue by taking the 
course? As they take the seminar, as they engage in the encounter, they are paying per credit 
hour: paying with money that they must borrow from someone else and pay back at some future 
point with interest. Jason T. Wozniak (2017) has argued that it is possible to block the 
subjectivating and mis-educative force of debt using what he calls counterpedagogies. Perhaps 
the better model for Marxist education would be such a counterpedagogy understood as a 
counterinterpellation that takes up and takes on the balance of forces afflicting indebted students, 
rather than a disinterpellation that suspends some social forces. The counterinterpellation model 
of critical educational practice would not subjectivate students in a superficially reversed 
ideology as Lewis argues, but rather bid students and teachers attend to the balance of forces 
around them with the goal of intervening in that balance, to take up and take on the ruling classes 
by struggling against the forces oppressing them.  
Allison G. Dover (2015) provides a case of this counterinterpellative model of critical 
educational practice. Dover studied teachers who incorporate social justice into their public 
school classrooms, specifically under constraints of state-mandated curricula and tests. Dover 
describes a literature teacher named Karen who, along with her students, counterinterpellated 
against their dilapidated school infrastructure.  
[Karen] described her unit as one that uses “literature to facilitate” wider 
conversations regarding race, class, and inequality; in her case, Macbeth leads to a 
wider examination of pressing social issues. After teaching the play, the students 
evaluated how the poor physical condition of their school affected their ability to 
perform theater. Students completed a thorough analysis of resource shortages 
and physical deficiencies at their school, developed a wish list of materials that 
would facilitate informal theater production, created formal proposals for 
renovations, and wrote letters to local businesses requesting donations to support 
their efforts (p. 524).  
The school and its infrastructure prevented these students from learning and performing 
Macbeth, the productive and repressive social forces acting on the school made it under-
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resourced in this way. The purpose of this unit, according to Karen, was to give students the 
opportunity to “write to change their environment” (p. 524). Like Szwaja’s curriculum of public 
protest, this opportunity for students to write to change their environment is a 
counterinterpellative pedagogy. Students took up and took on the interpellation of their school 
building, juxtaposed with their curricular requirements for reading Macbeth and writing, to 
change the balance of forces in their part of the social formation. Karen attempted to teach her 
students to intervene in that prohibitive political terrain, to struggle within and against the 
ideological constraints of their curriculum and facilities. Dover does not report the consequences 
of the letter-writing campaign, but we imagine the class exerted a force of some impact: perhaps 
a newspaper article, a response from City Hall, or even funds from the local businesses.  
I have extracted a dilemma from Lewis’s argument about disinterpellation and crafted 
two models of critical educational practice: the disinterpellation model and the 
counterinterpellation model. The question becomes: which should critical educators use, a model 
that seeks to suspend social forces or a model that takes up and takes on the existing balance of 
forces to alter them? Of course, this question is not an either/or matter and educators should use 
both models extensively. It may be the case that some disinterpellation must happen for a 
counterinterpellation to take place, or vice versa. It may even be an empirical question; that is, 
one that warrants observation of lived educational practice (just as Anyon and Carnoy and Levin 
did, along with Dover and Oyler) to take stock of what disinterpellations and 
counterinterpellations actually entail from moment to moment, and whether critical educators 
should adopt one or the other as their paradigm in the context of their positions in the balance of 
forces. This empirical research would be an exciting avenue for further inquiry. In any case, this 
contrast between the disinterpellation model and the counterinterpellation model is helpful in 
thinking about one’s commitments as a critical educator, and is a central finding of this essay. 
Conclusion 
Tyson E. Lewis’s fantastic work on Althusserian pedagogy is an important first step into 
an unexplored region of critical educational theory. Althusser’s philosophy has been misread for 
at least a generation of educational researchers. He takes the geological problematic seriously 
and continues this tradition of Marxist philosophy of education rather than eschewing it. Lewis’s 
delimiting of interpellation, counterinterpellation, and disinterpellation is an intervention to 
celebrate. However, I have shown that as Lewis is on his way towards theorizing 
disinterpellation, he moves past the concept of counterinterpellation too quickly. Jean-Jacques 
Lecercle’s understands counterinterpellation as an insult to the insult of interpellation; a taking 
up and taking on of dominant ideological constraints via creative exploitation to potentially alter 
the balance of forces within which the counterinterpellation is issued.  
Lewis also draws an equivalency between counterinterpellation and interpellation, 
claiming that they are both recruitments of some kind and thus should be associated with 
political activism rather than education. Disinterpellation according to this argument, which is 
neither interpellation nor counterinterpellation, renders both ideologies and counterideologies 
inoperative. Lewis therefore argues that distinterpellation is the better educational model. I have 
argued that this move, while important and fascinating, not only passes over a robust account of 
the concept of counterinterpellation, but that this concept broaches fundamental questions for 
critical educational practice. Lewis’s arguments about disinterpellation and counterinterpellation 
lead to a dilemma. Either one accepts that there is such a thing as an educational forceless force 
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which recruits to no ideology, or that every educational encounter happens in a balance of forces, 
which it both impacts and is impacted by.  
I have found that two models of critical education emerge from the dilemma. The 
distinterpellation model Lewis outlines says that education exerts a forceless force that suspends 
ideology, and that this suspension should be the aim of critical educators: to teach so that 
students engage in encounters where social forces suspend. According to this model, 
counterinterpellation is political activism and not educational. The counterinterpellation model I 
have outlined is different. Counterinterpellation is educational in this model, though it may also 
be political activism. The counterinterpellation model says that while disinterpellation may be an 
important notion to consider, educational practices exert force in the social formation and are 
exerted upon by other forces. Being a critical educator, according to this model, means knowing 
what kinds of social forces act on and through one’s classroom, and means teaching such that 
students learn how to make interventions that shift the social formation’s balance of forces.  
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